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ABSTRACT
Despite taking advantage of established learning
from other industries, quality improvement
initiatives in healthcare may struggle to
outperform secular trends. The reasons for this
are rarely explored in detail, and are often
attributed merely to difficulties in engaging
clinicians in quality improvement work. In a
narrative review of the literature, we argue that
this focus on clinicians, at the relative expense of
managerial staff, has proven counterproductive.
Clinical engagement is not a universal challenge;
moreover, there is evidence that managers—
particularly middle managers—also have a role
to play in quality improvement. Yet managerial
participation in quality improvement
interventions is often assumed, rather than
proven. We identify specific factors that influence
the coordination of front-line staff and managers
in quality improvement, and integrate these
factors into a novel model: the model of
alignment. We use this model to explore the
implementation of an interdisciplinary
intervention in a recent trial, describing different
participation incentives and barriers for different
staff groups. The extent to which clinical and
managerial interests align may be an important
determinant of the ultimate success of quality
improvement interventions.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade there have been con-
siderable efforts to evaluate and improve
the quality of healthcare delivery. Three
to six per cent of inpatient deaths may be
preventable,1–4 and early attempts to
foster better care invoked crew resource
management in aviation,5 industrial
quality assurance techniques6 and trans-
parent outcome reporting.7 However, the
pace of improvement remains sluggish,8
despite an awareness of how infrequently
patients receive the best therapy already
available.9 10
Quality improvement (QI) interven-
tions have enormous potential to
improve healthcare delivery, but well-
publicised research successes have proved
difficult to replicate outside the trial
setting.11–17 Discrete QI interventions
also struggle to outperform the secular
trend towards system-wide improve-
ment.17 18 The challenges of reproducing
QI successes on a wider scale remain
poorly understood, but two key factors
are often cited: the engagement of clin-
ical staff in the broader initiative, and the
context in which it takes place. Neither
clinical engagement19 nor context20 is
well defined, yet the two have become de
facto explanations for QI failure.
Moreover, the numerous attempts to
explain how context affects QI21–25 risk
overwhelming researchers and clini-
cians,21 with limited ‘how-to’ support for
those implementing change.20 Here, we
discuss whether the focus on clinical staff
is misplaced, and propose a novel, prag-
matic model for the development and
selection of effective, durable QI
interventions.
In a narrative synthesis guided by
insights from a recent trial (see box 1),
we first explore the varying definitions of
clinical engagement. We go on to discuss
the specific challenges of clinical engage-
ment in QI, and strategies shown to cir-
cumvent them. Next, we explore the role
of managerial staff, whose importance in
QI implementation has been underesti-
mated. Bringing these concepts together,
we outline a ‘model for alignment’, high-
lighting key factors of practical import-
ance for successful QI. The model is then
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used to retrospectively describe the implementation of
an interdisciplinary intervention (see box 2). The
model for alignment emphasises that QI efforts must
explicitly meet aligned clinical, managerial and organ-
isational needs if they are to become ‘business as
usual’.
ENGAGEMENT—A RECIPROCAL COMMITMENT
FROM STAFF AND THEIR ORGANISATION
There is no universal definition of engagement: it
may be an attitude, behaviour, an outcome—or all
three.26 Schaufeli et al27 describe engagement as an
employee’s positive motivational state, characterised
by ‘vigour, dedication and absorption’. A broader,
more cooperative, position is that engagement is a
two-way phenomenon, with an onus on the organisa-
tion to establish conditions encouraging engagement
and the opportunities for it to be manifest.28 Clinical
engagement, then, involves staff actively contributing
‘within their normal working roles to maintaining and
enhancing the performance of the organisation, which
itself recognises this commitment in supporting and
encouraging high quality care’.28 This working defin-
ition makes it clear that real engagement is a very dif-
ferent entity to staff acquiescence, for which it is
often confused.29 30
In QI, however, clinical engagement has been sum-
marised simply as staff ’s ‘active involvement’,31 with
no recognition of the possible dialogue between clini-
cians and those seeking to improve their performance.
That no organisational contribution is expected may
go some way to explaining why clinical engagement
has been problematic. Although there is specific litera-
ture pertaining to physician engagement, in this dis-
cussion (unless specified otherwise) we group clinical
healthcare professionals together. QI interventions are
typically interdisciplinary, and securing greater
engagement of a single staff group is not an end in
itself, only a step towards an ‘organisational culture
where all staff feel valued and involved’.30
CLINICAL ENGAGEMENT CAN BE IMPROVED
BY CO-DESIGN, LOCAL MODIFICATION AND
STRATEGIC SELECTION OF QI INTERVENTIONS
Healthcare professionals have been reluctant to
involve themselves in QI initiatives.31 This is espe-
cially apparent in periods of sustained organisational
turbulence, but is a long-standing, multifactorial and
international problem.31 Doctors are disproportion-
ately hesitant to participate in safety behaviours like
incident reporting,32 33 and active resistance from
senior staff remains the most common barrier to the
successful implementation of interdisciplinary safety
checklists.34–38 The narrative of ‘automatic’ clinical
resistance to new initiatives, or ‘change fatigue’,31 is
seemingly widely accepted within the QI literature.
Circumventing this fatigue is considered a major
triumph, even fundamental to QI success. With few
exceptions,24 25 local QI breakthroughs are attributed
to good clinical engagement; conversely, failures are
seen only through the prism of inadequate clinical
buy-in.
Not all interventions are subject to the same clinical
disengagement barrier, however: some programmes
might have lower thresholds for participation.21 39 40
Conversely, problems with the introduction of a spe-
cific improvement strategy do not necessarily indicate
a wider reluctance to change practice. The interven-
tion’s characteristics, at least in part, determine its
reception. In our experience, iterative co-design of a
structured quality and safety briefing intervention
with physicians, to maximise its face validity, miti-
gated much of their expected resistance (see box 2).
The process of co-design may also in itself improve
staff ownership of the intervention. Other strategies
may also have immediate appeal: interventions that
used peer facilitation,41 wider reporting options and
Box 1 Autoethnographic observations from the
Hospital Event Analysis Describing Significant
Unanticipated Problems (HEADS-UP) study83
▸ The HEADS-UP study evaluated an interdisciplinary
team intervention tailored for general medical wards:
a structured, daily safety and quality briefing.83 92
▸ HEADS-UP briefings were designed to embed pro-
active organisational risk surveillance into routine
ward care. Through structured discussion, clinical
staff would identify risks to the delivery of high
quality care on a daily basis, addressing them
promptly through facilitated communication with
senior clinicians and managers, before patient harm
occurred.
▸ One of the authors of this paper (SP) was heavily
involved in HEADS-UP implementation at two institu-
tions, and in facilitating the use of the data arising
from it—a form of participatory research.93 His
observations, discussions with staff, reflections on
clinical governance proceedings and implementation
challenges were recorded in field notes over a
20-month period.
▸ These ‘autoethnographic’ insights, from researchers
embedded within their host organisations, are widely
used in organisational case study research, providing
rich accounts of culture and practices.51 94 95
▸ Observations from the HEADS-UP study informed the
narrative synthesis of the literature described here,
and the construction of the model of alignment for
successful quality improvement interventions.
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feedback,42–47 or engaging whole teams to identify
problems48–50 all seemingly fell on fertile ground.
Even when QI strategies do not appeal intuitively to
clinicians, generating clinical engagement need not
prove an insurmountable challenge. Defining the ‘soft
periphery’ of a QI programme—the elements that
should be flexibly adapted to optimise the pro-
gramme’s acceptance, without invalidating the entire
intervention—is key.51 Making the effort to appropri-
ately modify QI tools for the context in which they
will be applied (eg, creating separate versions of surgi-
cal safety checklists for different specialties) then
makes those tools much more palatable for clini-
cians.34 In fact, local adaptation is the most commonly
cited factor affecting checklist implementation, more
so even than resistance from specific clinicians.34 This
reflects each organisation’s responsibility to create the
opportunities for meaningful engagement: active clin-
ical involvement is more likely when QI tools have
been purposefully tailored, and when there is pro-
tected time for training to use them.31 34 In contrast,
unmodified checklists are unlikely to be used as
intended, nor improve patient outcomes—regardless
of hospitals’ reported compliance.13 52
While co-design and local modification do improve
the adoption of QI interventions, the financial and
opportunity costs of pre-existing efforts represent a
major challenge to any new initiative. Relentless
organisational change, with little sense of an overall
strategic direction, also contributes to a general
ennui.31 Clinicians, believing that each ‘fad’ will soon
be replaced with another, feel there is ‘little point in
investing heavily in any one initiative’.31 The strategic
selection of a limited number of QI interventions,
appropriate to the organisation’s capacity to imple-
ment them, is therefore crucial.23 53 Experts have
identified 22 patient safety strategies with a sufficient
evidence base to recommend their widespread adop-
tion:54 55 organisations may choose to focus on these
first, with a view to their specific local needs.
However, if organisations are to select only the QI
targets that they have the capacity and willpower to
Box 2 Applying the model of alignment to analyse Hospital Event Analysis Describing Significant
Unanticipated Problems (HEADS-UP) implementation at one study site
▸ Poor engagement with incident reporting was an organisational concern. However, there was little capacity to enact
an improvement programme. No other goals were set aside to prioritise the HEADS-UP programme. As an experimen-
tal intervention, the efficacy of HEADS-UP and its implementation strategy was unknown. (Strategic selection of
quality improvement (QI) target and intervention)
▸ Front-line staff expressed initiative fatigue at the beginning of the study, but the face validity of the HEADS-UP tool
(and its co-design) mitigated much of their expected resistance, and HEADS-UP was incorporated into normal work-
flow. QI participation was not formally rewarded, but some junior clinical staff were able to exploit their involvement
in HEADS-UP to help with career progression. Others reflected that they found HEADS-UP useful for their own practice
and that it improved the quality of interdisciplinary care for their patients, which may have been perceived as a
benefit or reward. (Incentives and actions for front-line clinical staff )
▸ Middle managers were not personally incentivised to participate in HEADS-UP, although an endorsement by the
Care Quality Commission during the study period prompted senior managers to designate a greater focus on the
programme. Where HEADS-UP generated information to bolster middle managers’ existing business plans and
develop new ones, those managers coordinated staff-identified opportunities for service development with linked
organisational priorities. They gave HEADS-UP their personal backing, encouraging its use, although no additional
resources were available to accompany this support. In contrast, middle managers for whom HEADS-UP was less
directly useful did less to hold their service areas accountable for HEADS-UP performance. HEADS-UP piggybacked
onto existing staff meetings and governance structures: no protected time was made available for involvement in
dedicated training, analysis or feedback. Middle managers’ time and attention was strictly limited, and competing
priorities (eg, the implementation of an electronic health record, or a forthcoming merger) often precluded mean-
ingful progress with this QI intervention. Interestingly, resolution of the persistent issues raised in the HEADS-UP
briefings appeared to depend less on each one’s inherent safety threat, than on agreement between clinical staff
and managers of the need for change. (Incentives and actions for middle managers)
▸ The organisation focused heavily on clinical quality, investing in external consultants to help develop new clinical ser-
vices and improve the efficiency of existing ones. Board members also dedicated substantial time to clinical quality
issues. In fact, clinical quality was the focus of numerous committees and subcommittees, with a complex, devolved
governance structure. However, the regulatory environment did not allow for a self-determined quality strategy, with
quality priorities established largely by the local healthcare commissioning body and a national quality inspectorate.
Board-level meetings were awash with clinical quality metrics, among which the ‘softer data’ emerging from the
HEADS-UP briefings had a less certain place.96 As the organisation moved to merge with another institution, fewer
resources were available for continuous QI in the interim. (Incentives and actions for senior managers)
Research and reporting methodology
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pursue, other potentially valuable initiatives need be
deferred in the interests of preserving engagement and
momentum. Regulatory bodies have an important role
here: they should give institutions the time and space
to develop these focused improvement strategies.56 It
may seem odd to decry the slow pace of improve-
ment, and yet advocate a more deliberate, institution-
specific approach. With space for self-determination,
however, organisations that strategically shape their
QI attempts go on to see wider benefits, tackling deep
cultural issues that go unaddressed with more haphaz-
ard approaches.56
BEYOND CLINICAL ENGAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF
MANAGERS IN QI
Improving clinical engagement is only part of the
solution to ineffective QI: ‘administrative engagement
is equally important, or disillusionment… ensues’.29
Quality of care is not a leading priority for many hos-
pital boards, however.57–59 Although board-level
attention to quality issues has been associated with
clinical quality,57 58 60 how this commitment trans-
lates, in practice, into front-line action remains
unclear.61 A recent survey study provided a key
insight: board and middle management practices are
linked, and correlate strongly with hospital perform-
ance on clinical quality metrics.62 Certain board
characteristics were specifically linked to middle man-
agement styles: board attention to quality was asso-
ciated with management practices that monitored it,
and the use of quality metrics at board level corre-
sponded to good operational management and target
setting.62 If good management is truly associated with
clinical quality, the role of managers in QI deserves
further attention.
Yet managerial participation in QI interventions is
often assumed, rather than analysed in detail.
Although senior hospital executives may participate
constructively in collaborative safety programmes,14 63
more often, active managerial involvement goes no
further than the ‘expressions of support’ described in
many QI reports. More detailed evaluations describe
difficulties recruiting executives to work with QI
teams, even as part of major safety initiatives.25 When
they do engage, managers have a different outlook on
quality and safety programmes to clinical staff, per-
ceiving different components of the programme to be
valuable and holding more positive views of the
overall results.64 Meaningful input from managers is
important for the design, monitoring and evaluation
of QI interventions;64 simply obtaining their permis-
sion to proceed is not enough.
There is little published work on the role of man-
agers in QI, the majority of which relates only to
senior (board-level) managers, rather than the middle
managers under their supervision.59 61 Importantly,
most improvement initiatives fail to specify how they
engage these middle managers, with whom front-line
staff interact directly and regularly. Middle managers
are a particularly heterogeneous group, with diverse
professional backgrounds,61 often promoted on the
basis of a technical skill set rather than any specific
leadership or management ability.65 Many have
‘hybrid’ clinical and administrative duties,61 66 with
an inherent tension between those roles;67 their deci-
sions are necessarily ‘constrained, contested and polit-
ical’,68 but favour knowledge drawn from experience
rather than research findings.69 70 Little more is
known about the cognitive biases that affect middle
managers’ judgements, but enthusiasm for QI is not
automatic. For example, they may feel the operating
costs of QI programmes are not justified by any
potential future benefits.71 There remains a pressing
need for research into how healthcare managers
balance their multiple fiscal, statutory and service
responsibilities.59
INFLUENCING MIDDLE MANAGERS TO FACILITATE
EFFECTIVE QI: STATUS, INCENTIVES AND
RESOURCES
It appears, then, that managers contribute to organisa-
tional quality; that their active involvement in QI has
been taken for granted rather than proven; and that
their decision making relating to QI is likely to be
complex, with conflicting priorities that are not easily
resolved. Yet middle managers, in particular, are
uniquely placed to facilitate effective QI. They have
the power to accelerate or impede the implementation
of innovations,61 mediating organisational messages
for front-line staff, but also upwardly influencing their
seniors to draw attention to the high-level support
needed for specific QI programmes.72 73 Acting as
information brokers, translating organisational strat-
egy into actionable tasks, and promoting innovative
practice, middle managers can convince clinical staff
to prioritise QI implementation among numerous
competing demands.61
Harnessing middle managers’ ability to broker
organisational and front-line attention to a QI pro-
gramme may prove essential to its success: proactive
commitment from middle managers does influence
effective QI implementation.74 Although many advo-
cate a clinician-led, ‘bottom-up’ approach to improve-
ment,75 staff-driven initiatives that do not align well
with strategic priorities have only limited impact or
longevity.71 76 77 Clear tensions emerge when QI
efforts are delegated entirely to clinicians without
support for their direction and goals.71 Without more
senior support, front-line staff are unable to marshal
the resources required to spread change,78 and man-
agers have an important role to play in navigating
cross-departmental obstacles.59 Managers who effect-
ively facilitate QI, without micromanaging it, are well
appreciated by front-line staff.78 The subsequent pace
of change may be slow, but a combination of
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top-down and bottom-up implementation results in a
lasting impact.78
Senior managers play a role in determining middle
managers’ commitment to QI. These senior managers
should directly emphasise QI as an organisational pri-
ority, incentivise QI commitment in performance
reviews, and—vitally—make available the necessary
resources.72 In addition, encouraging middle man-
agers to leverage the human resources and perform-
ance reviews at their own disposal also improves their
commitment to QI implementation.72 Interestingly, a
performance-related human resources management
framework for clinicians has recently been described
and implemented, encountering little of the expected
physician resistance.79 Transparent negotiation of
QI goals at each organisational level may therefore
be feasible and necessary for high quality
implementation.
A MODEL OF ALIGNMENT FOR SUCCESSFUL QI
We suggest that neither clinicians nor managers can
make meaningful QI progress in isolation: their col-
laboration is fundamental to sustainably embedding
practice innovations. The choice of a QI intervention,
and its implementation model, both need coordin-
ation between clinical and managerial teams. We have
discussed, in the preceding sections, how each group
might be motivated to take part in this process. Yet
their efforts need to be aligned, if QI is to form a
significant part of their workload, and not be over-
whelmed by other priorities.62 We highlight some
examples of QI programmes in which the degree of
collaboration between front-line and managerial staff
may have contributed to the ultimate outcome
(table 1). In trials reporting significant improvements,
investigators ensured there was adequate managerial
participation—or took on managerial roles themselves
—to complement clinical involvement.11 12 15 80
Similarly, implementation and spread of a QI interven-
tion in a real-world setting was best accomplished
with the co-leadership of top-level administrators and
front-line champions.78 Where managerial engage-
ment was lacking, interventions did not improve out-
comes significantly, or systems defects did not prove
amenable to the efforts of clinical teams alone.13 17 81
With this in mind, we propose a simplified model
for successful QI interventions (figure 1). This model
emphasises, foremost, that QI interventions aiming to
change healthcare providers’ practice should aim to
meet the aligned needs of staff at multiple levels in
the organisation. Failing to coordinate these interests
renders interventions susceptible to failure, regardless
of enthusiasm and engagement at the other organisa-
tional levels. In fact, the degree to which an interven-
tion recognises, makes use of, or conflicts with
existing staff priorities is fundamental to its success,
and should not be considered in the accompanying
implementation strategy only. This pre-emptive
Table 1 Descriptions of managerial collaboration in selected quality improvement (QI) interventions
QI intervention
Implementation phase
(proof of concept/trial/
scaling up) Managerial collaboration Outcome
Surgical safety checklist Trial11 12 80 Systems changes facilitated by the local
investigator—essentially fulfilling a dedicated
managerial role.11 Hospital administration/
management leaders required to ‘support the
intervention’11 80
Reduced in-hospital complications
Scaling up13 No assessment of managerial involvement in
mandatory checklist implementation. Meaningful
local implementation unlikely to have taken
place52
No significant change in patient
outcomes
Program to reduce central
line infections
Trial15 Program targeted middle managers and senior
hospital leaders as well as front-line staff.24
Chief executives wrote ‘commitment letter’ to
the program team. Nurse manager led the
project locally; project team also included a
hospital executive advocate
Reduced infection rates
Scaling up17 Chief executives agreed organisations would
participate, and that a director would join the
local project team. In practice, most units
struggled to involve executives25
No improvement compared with controls
Program to detect and
mitigate organisational
weaknesses
Proof of concept81 Executive sponsor for each site team.
Managerial staff less often directly involved as
project team members
System defects not tractable to small
clinical teams’ QI methodology
Program to improve
interprofessional
coordination
Scaling up78 Spectrum of managerial involvement. In
‘bottom-up’ hospitals, administrators delegated
and served as resources. In ‘top-down’
hospitals, managers primarily drove the change
effort
Co-leadership of top-level administrators
and front-line champions best facilitated
implementation and spread of the
intervention
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consideration of where an intervention is likely to
garner support, and the conflicts that need to be
resolved to allow wholehearted participation, reflect
the ‘practical wisdom’ thought to be a critical element
of successful QI.82 Throughout this narrative literature
review, and reinforced by our recent practical experi-
ence (box 1), we identified specific facilitators that
coordinate clinical, middle management and senior
management participation in QI. To build a useful
model, we then separated these factors into incentives
(establishing each group’s QI participation as a core
expectation of their work) and actions (specific
actions by that group that make QI implementation
more effective). We also highlight important barriers
to aligned QI, again identified from the narrative syn-
thesis. For facilitators and barriers, we focused delib-
erately on modifiable factors, with a view to building
a valid model that has immediate application in prac-
tice. Importantly, the inclusion of managers as core
members of the QI team may augment what is actually
‘modifiable’: changes that remain frustratingly out of
reach for clinical QI teams81 may fall within the remit
of an expanded clinical-managerial group.
How could this model be used in practice?
Prospectively, clinicians and managers jointly establish
and prioritise the challenges facing their service.
Multidisciplinary tools systematically collect data rele-
vant to front-line care delivery problems (from staff
and patients).83 84 Teams then assess and rank the
apparent safety threats, for example with streamlined
versions of tools like Healthcare Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis or Hierarchical Task Analysis.81 85
These tools inform the strategic selection of high pri-
ority targets for local improvement efforts.
Interventions are co-designed or adapted with clini-
cians, with a focus on the quality strategies for which
effectiveness and implementation evidence is stron-
gest. Clinicians’ participation is supported, recognised
and rewarded, perhaps as part of a formal perform-
ance management process. Middle managers coordin-
ate alignment of the improvement efforts with
organisational goals, and are themselves heavily incen-
tivised to see QI facilitation as a core role of their
own. Influencing their supervisors to attract organisa-
tional support and resources for QI efforts, middle
managers’ interest in quality is further reinforced by
protected board time for quality issues, and
board-level use of quality metrics. Board members
may need to robustly engage with other stakeholders
in the local healthcare economy to generate (and
protect) an institution-specific quality strategy.
The model can also be used retrospectively, to
describe how interventions were implemented in prac-
tice, and to explain their effects. We use the model to
explore a recent interdisciplinary intervention in our
own institutions, describing mutable influences on
staff over the course of a trial (see box 2). Definitive
progress on a number of key issues occurred only
when front-line staff and middle managers agreed the
need for change.
Figure 1 The model of alignment. Strategically selected quality improvement targets and interventions successfully align the
interests of clinicians and non-clinicians at multiple levels within the organisation. At each level, staff engagement with these
interventions is facilitated by deliberate incentives to prioritise it, the recognition of competing priorities and barriers to involvement,
and actions to address them.
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We feel the proposed model of alignment is a
useful, novel concept for a number of reasons. First, it
emphasises the need to go beyond clinical engage-
ment. Second, it highlights the role of non-clinical
staff in sustaining effective QI. Most importantly, it
integrates separate literature streams on clinical and
managerial influences on QI, lending itself to the pro-
spective design of interventions as well as the retro-
spective analysis of why they achieved their goals or
not. Interestingly, multilevel interventions (explicitly
addressing patient, professional and organisational
factors, for example) show the most consistent
improvements in process and clinical outcomes.86 The
model of alignment suggests how we might incorpor-
ate a similarly multifaceted approach into the design
of any new QI intervention. Other authors have
recently raised concerns about ‘colliding’ QI interven-
tions, conceived in isolation but effectively competing
in a limited marketplace.87 Our model encourages a
broader analysis of the environment into which any
new QI intervention is launched.
We hope this model will prove useful for future
interventions, which will need to more explicitly link
their assumptions with underlying theory.88 However,
it does not negate the value of existing models, which
remain well placed to structure QI reporting and
evaluation.21–23 The model of alignment was derived
from a narrative review of the literature, drawing on
prior systematic reviews,31 59 and tested retrospect-
ively against the experience of implementing a single
intervention. It requires more empirical validation,
particularly in the prospective design of novel inter-
ventions. Lastly, though parsimony is necessary for a
‘good’ theory of context,88 the model of alignment
may be too simplistic for some analyses.
CONCLUSION
Critics of implementation research argue that its the-
ories are no more helpful than common sense.89 90
Proponents reply that these theories are open to ques-
tioning, while common sense—in itself an informal,
‘lay’ theory—relies on implicit assumptions that are
difficult to challenge.20 What we have described here,
we hope, might satisfy both camps. Sharing the
concern that existing theories offer little to practi-
tioners at the sharp end, and informed by our own
recent experience of a complex QI intervention, we
offer a focal point for the design and evaluation of
future attempts to improve healthcare delivery. The
extent to which QI aligns the interests of front-line
staff and their managers has not previously been
explored in this way.
Perhaps, in truth, we have historically expected too
much of clinicians in QI, and demanded too little of
their managers. Previous assumptions that managers
are well prepared to make meaningful contributions
to QI interventions have not been substantiated.59
The next generation of guidelines for QI reporting
will emphasise narrative understanding,91 and this
should extend to fuller descriptions of whether clin-
ical and managerial priorities coincided (or collided)
within the context of the intervention. Although there
are few hard barriers to either group’s participation in
QI, competing demands force clinicians and managers
to rationalise their efforts, and in some cases con-
sciously relinquish other priorities. Developing effect-
ive and sustainable QI interventions may depend on
our ability to align the two groups’ divergent interests.
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